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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXXI SEPTEMBER, 1945 NUMBER I
FOREIGN FUNDS CONTROL AND THE
ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN
KENNETH S. CARLSTON
"War never breaks out quite suddenly, and its spreading is not the
work of a moment.
"War is nothing but a cotinuation of political intercourse with an
admixture of other means."
VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR
"Freezing Control is but one phase of the present war effort; it is
but one weapon in the 'total' war which is now being waged on both
economic and military fronts. Coupled with Freezing Control as a part
of this natianfs economic warfare are to be found export control, the
promulgation of a Black List, censorship, seizure of enemy-owned prop-
erty, and financial and lend-lease aid to allied and friendly nations."
Brief of the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Commission for
Polish Relief v. Banca Nationala
a Runwniei, 288 N. Y. 332
(1942).
The past decade or so has witnessed a vast expansion in governmental
controls in the foreign economic sphere. At first adopted as a refuge from
the disastrous and world-wide economic storms of the 'thirties, measures
such as devaluation and the establishment of systems of foreign exchange
control were soon seen to have a positive utility as economic weapons both
nationally and internationally. In Germany particularly, foreign exchange
control became a powerful instrument in a national policy of authoritarian
control. As a means for directing the currents of foreign trade, it became
an instrument of political power for economic pefietration and political per-
suasion of specific countries, and for the control of production and consump-
tion in desired channels within Germany itself.' By 1934, a broad foreign
1ELLIs, EXCHANGE CONTROL IN CENTRAL EUROPE (1941) 289; see HAYEK, THE ROAD
TO SER.DO- (1944) 92, n. 2.
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trade control of exports and imports was established, regulating thie types
and quantities of goods, prices, means of payment, and countries to be
favored or disfavored.2
In the United States, however, the establishment in 1940 of foreign funds
control under Executive Order No. 8389, as amended,3 was primarily a
measure of defense against the Axis. It was designed to prevent the use
of property, in which an Axis interest existed, in a manner inimical to
the interests of the United States, and to safeguard the property of citizens
of Axis-occupied countries. 4 It was authorized by Section 5(b) of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended,5 and its application is limited
2 d. at 284-285.
3EXEC. ORDER No. 8389, 5 FED. REG. 1400 (1940). This Order, as amended, will be
generally referred to herein as "Order 8389" or "the Order"; various other Executive
Orders will be referred to by number with only the prefix "Order." The Order pro-
hibits all transactions in foreign exchange and various other transfers of property, "if
(i) such transactions are by, or on behalf of, or pursuant to the direction of any foreign
country designated in this Order, or any national thereof, or (ii) such transactions
involve property in which any foreign country designated in this Order, or any national
thereof, has at any time on or since the effective date of this Order had any interest
of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect."
486 CONG. Rac. 5180 (1940); SEN. REP. No. 911, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 2;
H. R. REP. No. 1507, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 3, quoted infra note 54. Other pur-
poses are facilitating the use of blocked assets in the war effort, protecting American
banks, business institutions and creditors, and negotiating in the post-war settlements,
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Commission for Polish Relief v. Banca
Nationala a Rumaniei, 288 N. Y. 332, 43 N. E. (2d) 345 (1942).
555 STAT. 839 (1941), 12 U. S. C. § 95a (Supp. 1941-1945), reading in'part as follows:
"The first sentence of subdivision (b) of Section 5 of the Trading with the Enemy Act
of October 6, 1917 (40 STAT. 411), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"(1) During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency
declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may
designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may pre-
scribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise-
"(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transactions in foreign exchange,
transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking
institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking
of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, and
"(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or pro-
hibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, trans-
portation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest,
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States; and any property or interest of any foreign country or national
thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms, directed by the President, in
such agency or person as may be designated from time to time by the President,
and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe such inter-
est or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise
dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such
designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the
accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes."
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by the terms of that section to "time of war or during any other period of,
national emergency." It is accordingly an instrument of exceptional and
limited use and not an instrument of our peacetime economy.
As a war instrument, Order 8389 is directed in a negative way. Its com-
mands are prohibitive rather than positive. It does not compel but rather
prevents action. Hence with the entry of the United States into the present °
war, the need of broad powers became apparent whereby the Government
could "affirmatively compel the use of application of foreign property" in
the interests of the United States.6 However, under the applicable Trading
with the Enemy Act, which had been enacted in World War I, the presi-
dent's power was limited to the appointment of "an official to be known as
the alien property custodian," who would have the power to seize and liqui-
date property of an "enemy" and "ally of enemy.' 7 These statutory categories
of enemy interest were terms of much more limited application than those
now applied in the control of enemy property. In general, they made resi-
dence in enemy or enemy-occupied territory the criterion of the power to
seize. Order 8389, on the other hand, permitted the use of every possible
test to seek out enemy interest. In addition to the classic tests of foreign
residence or domicile," it established the criteria of foreign nationality, foreign
control and even "reasonable cause to believe" as means for determining
alien interest.9 Previous legislation, moreover, had as its primary objective
custody and only incidentally liquidation. As stated by Judge John Bassett
Moore:
The idea of provisionally holding enemy property in custody in order
to prevent its use in the enemy interest is by no means new. In England,
it is at least as old as Magna Carta. No one understood the act of
Congress to contemplate a hostile seizure. The very terms of the act
The Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, will generally be
referred to herein as "the Act" and the various sections thereof by number only, with-
out the prefix "Section."
OSEN. REP. No. 911, supra note 4, at 2.
7§§ 2, 6, 7(c) and 12 of the Act. See Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 51,
43 Sup. Ct. 486 (1923); Munich Reinsurance Co. v. First Reinsurance Co., 6 F. (2d)
742 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), appeal dismissed 273 U. S. 666, 47 Sup. Ct. 458 (1927).8Until the issuance of Executive Order No. 8389, it may fairly be said that residence
was the test of enemy status under American law, WHAT0N, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(6th ed. 1929) 674 et seq.; Kahn v. Garvan, 263 Fed. 909, 915 (S. D. N. Y. 1920) ;
and § 7(c) was not construed to establish nationality as a test of enemy character,
Behn, Meyer and Co. v. Miller, 266 U. S. 457, 472-473, 45 Sup. Ct. 155, 167 (1925.).9 See Lourie, "Enemy" under the Trading with the Enemy Act and Some Problems of
International Law (1943) 42 Micxr. L. REv. 383; Note, New Administrative Definitions
of "Entemy" to Supersede the Trading with the Enemy Act (1942) 51. YALE L. J. 1388;
Littauer, Confiscation of Property of Technical .9minies (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 739.
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preclude such an interpretation. It merely authorized the provisional
holding of the property in custody, and appropriately styled the official,
who was to perform this function, the Alien Property Custodian.' °
It was apparently the intention of Congress in the Act as it stood in World
War I not to confiscate outright enemy property but to hold it for the bene-
fit of the original owners."' In the view of one authority:
The tenor of the debates in Congress, together with the reports of the
committees to Congress and the statements of the Secretaries of State
and Commerce, all point to the fact that it was the intention of Congress
to hold the private property of persons living in Germany or doing busi-
ness in Germany in order to preserve the property for the actual
owners.'
2
The complexities of modem economic warfare and the many fronts upon
which it is to be waged' 3 demanded a tool of greater flexibility than that
afforded by the then existing provisions of the Act.14 Section 5(b) of the
Act was therefore amended in the First War Powers Act, 1941,'- by the
inclusion of the following new provision:
. . . and any property or interest of any foreign country or national
thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms, directed by the Presi-
dent, in such agency or person as may be designated from time to time
by the President, and upon such terms and conditions as the President
may prescribe such interest or property shall be held, used, administered,
liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the
benefit of the United States.
Untrammeled by any statutory tests of enemy character, power to "vest"
any foreign property was granted the Executive. In addition, active powers
of use and disposition of vested property were granted in the specific authori-
zation and direction that such property "shall be held, used, administered,
liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit
of the United States."' 6
'
0 MOoRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME CURRENT ILLUSIONS (1924) 22.
IlWoodson v. Deutsche G. & S. S. V. Roessler, 292 U. S. 449, 454, 54 Sup. Ct. 804,
805 (1934) stating that 12 of the Act "suggests that confiscation was not effected or
intended"; Cummings v. Societe Suisse Pours Valeurs de Metaux, 85 F. (2d) 287,
289 (App. D. C. 1936) (United States never declared the seized property their own
but rather eventually regarded it as a trust fund) ; Kahn v. Garvan, supra note 8.
1
-
2 GATHirNGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERIcAN TREATMENT OF ENE.Y ALIEN
PROPERTY (1940) 65.
13 EINZIG, EcONOmiC WARFARE (1940); Bidwell, Our Economic Warfare (1942) 20
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 421.
14 SEN. REP. No. 911, H. R. REP. No. 1507, supra note 4.
'
5 See note 5 supra.




The nature and effect of the custodian's powers were examined by Dulles
in The Vesting Powers of the Alien Property Custodian,'7 and the conclu-
sion reached that these must be regarded not as confiscatory in nature but
rather as a form of sequestration in aid of the system of regulation and
control of property of foreign nationals established under Order 8389. The
power to liquidate and sell vested property was viewed as ancillary to the
power of 'sequestration and to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances
as a means of preserving property values.
This conclusion, though carefully elaborated, is not felt to be supported
in the history, purpose and language of the amendment to 5(b) in the First
War Powers Act, 1941. This amendment contemplates and provides for more
than merely "vesting" and the control of foreign property established in the
Alien Property Custodian pursuant to its provisions is more than merely
"freezing control." The latter is regulatory in nature. It prohibits any
use of so-called blocked assets except under Government license. "Vesting,"
on the other hand, is the act marking the assumption of tlhe broad powers
over specific foreign property permitted under the amendment to 5(b) by
the "agency or person" designated by the president. The exercise of these
powers, so far as the terms of 5(b) are concerned, is restricted only by the
qualification that it must be "in the interest of and for the benefit of the
United States." There is nothing in 5(b) or congressional committee re-
ports to indicate that the exercise of these powers was to be solely in aid of
a system of regulation and that, for example, the power of sale was to be
limited to cases where required to preserve .values intact.' 8 Both the House
and the Senate considered the amendment of 5(b) made in the First War
Powers Act, 1941, necessary in order 'that the Government could "affirma-
tively compel the use and application of foreign property" in the interests
of, the United States.19 The amendment was considered to graft into 5(b)
"the power contained in the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to
alien property, extending those powers." 20 Thus enemy resources were,
through "vesting," to be taken over by the United States and thereafter used
or disposed of in whatever way the national interest might dictate.
17(1943) 28 CoRN. L. Q. 253.
ISld. at 253, relying on the isolated phrase that the enlargement of 5(b) is "a logical
extension of the foreign property control system" and ignoring the portions quoted
infra note 54 showing the real purpose of such "extension."
'
9SEN. REP. No. 911, supra note 4, at 2. See generally infra note 54.
20H. R. REP. No. 1507, supra note 4, at 3.
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It is true that Congress, in so amending 5(b), used terms of such breadth
that in the exercise of the authorized powers confiscatory acts could con-
ceivably take place and yet be within the apparent scope of such powers.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that the amendment must be more
narrowly construed if its constitutionality is to be saved. In determining the
constitutionality of 5(b), it is not to be presumed that the Executive, in
carrying out the powers thus conferred, will do so in a manner violative of
the Constitution or of treaty rights or of international law. If executive dis-
cretion exists, as it does here, to carry out delegated powers in a manner
consonant with our laws and traditions, it is to be presumed that this dis-
cretion will be exercised in the light of its limitations. Confiscation is a
question of fact. While 5(b) does not preclude the exercise of the power
of confiscation of enemy property or, indeed, of alien friends, whether con-
fiscation results depends upon what action is taken by the Executive under
5(b). Dulles contends that 5(b) should not be construed to permit of con-
fiscatory action, since, if permissible at all, its exercise is not limited solely
to time of war and the property of alien enemies.21 But this ignores not
only the plain language of the statute providing for the use, liquidation or
sale of alien property (including alien enemy property) but, as above noted,
also the intent of Congress, which, rather than contemplating that the use
of these additional powers would be limited to cases of prevention of waste,
instead looked forward to their active use in whatever way the best interests
of the United States might require.
An analysis of the terms of the vesting orders theiselves, as heretofore
issued by the Secretary of the Treasury and the custodian, indicates that
the pover to confiscate is being held in reserve and is not exercised by the
act of vesting itself. Vesting Order No. 1 of the Secretary, and all vesting
orders of the custodian, recite that the property in question is by the Order
being vested "to be held, used, administered, liquidat ed, sold or otherwise
dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States." In
other words, vesting is an act of custody preliminary to such use and dis-
position of the property as may be later determined. It does not preclude a
later return of the property vested or payment of compensation for its
taking. Vesting Order No. 1 of the Secretary of the Treasury expressly
reserved and provided for the possibility of return of the property vested
or payment of compensation for its taking,22 and a similar recital appears
21Dulles, loc. cit. supra note 17, at 251.22
"Such property and any proceeds thereof shall be held in a special account pending
further determination of the Secretary of the Treasury. This shall not be deemed to
[Vol. 31
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in all vesting orders of the custodian.2 3 In its press release on Vesting Order
No. 1, the Treasury Department remarked that the property vested was
to be considered as "sequestered."24
The conclusion that the step of vesting is to be regarded not as confiscation
but as preliminary custody receives support in the decisions on the legal
effect of seizures made by the former custodian under World War I legis-
lation. Under 7(c) of the Act as it then stood the custodian was authorized
to seize enemy property and by 12 of the Act he was granted the power of
sale and other rights incidental to ownership of seized property as though
he were its absolute owner.25 Such a seizure was considered to result in a
complete and absolute divestment of title from the enemy,26 leaving the
enemy owner remediless as against the custodian for re.sulting losses. 27 Yet
notwithstanding this very clear and explicit loss of title and interest by the
enemy, seizure was regarded by the courts as preliminary custody. 2 It was
said that the power to confiscate implicit in the Act was held in reserve, and
was not, except in small part, exercised; "the contrary would have violated
international usage of at least one hundred years."2
A review of the treatment of enemy property as in fact carried out by
Congress fairly leads to the conclusion that, subject to exceptional instances,
such as the Chemical Foundation case, 0 respect was given to the rule of
international law "that the state may not confiscate private property of aliens
within their borders at the outbreak of war." 31 The first step taken towards
the return of enemy property was in the Act of July 11, 1919, which amended
the Act so as to empower the president to return seized property of citizens
limit the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to return such property or the proceeds
thereof, or to indicate that compensation will not be paid in lieu thereof, if and when
it should be determined that such return or compensation should be made." 7 FFD.
REG. 1046 (1942).23E.g., Vesting Order 4191, 9 FED. REG. 13818 (1944).24Treasury Press Release, Feb. 16, 1942.
2540 STAT. 460 (1918), 50 U. S. C. § 12 (Appendix).
26Cummings v. Deutsche Bank, 300 U. S. 115, 57 Sup. Ct. 359 (1937); Woodson v.
Deutsche G. & S. S. V. Roessler, stpra note 11.
27Swiss National Insurance Co. v. Miller, 267 U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 213 (1925)
Klein v. Palmer, 18 *F. (2d) 932 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) ; Von Bruning v. Sutherland, 29
F. (2d) 631 (App. D. C. 1928).28Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554, 569, 41 Sup. Ct. 214, 216 (1921);
Sielcken-Schwarz v. American Factors, 60 F. (2d) 43, 45 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).29Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Steams, 65 F. (2d) 371, 374 (C. C. A. 2d,
1933), cert. den. 290 U. S. 670, 54 Sup. Ct. 90 (1933) ; see supra note 11..30United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 1 (1926). Note
that in this often questioned disposition of enemy patents the forms prescribed by the
statute with respect to private sales of property were observed and a consideration
found by the president to be adequate was paid.
3 1 GATHINGS, op. cit. s;tpra note 12, at 14.
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or subjects of countries allied with the United States whose property had
been taken by virtue of their residence in* occupied territory.32 The return
of certain additional classes of seized property, including that of citizens or
subjects of the states newly created by treaty and of persons no longer
classifiable as enemies, was authorized under the Act of June 5, 1920.
3 3
Then the Winslow Act of March 4, 1923, authorized the return of all property
claimed by former enemies in the amount of ten thousand dollars or less.34
In addition, the Winslow Act directed the former alien property custodian
to return any patent which had not been sold, licensed or otherwise disposed
of. Finally, the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928 provided for the
return of 80% of the property of nationals of Germany, Austria and Hungary
and directed that they should receive participating certificates for the remain-
ing 207. 35 Under arbitration proceedings instituted pursuant to the last
mentioned Act, the United States voluntarily awarded $12,485,387.83 to
German nationals for use by the United States of patents seized by the
custodian.36
Vesting, in other words, is the act whereby the door is opened to such
supervision, use and disposition of foreign property as may thereafter be
found to be in the national interest. While the term "vest" as used in its real
property sense signifies the fixation of a present right to the immediate or
future enjoyment of property,37 whether its use in a statute signifies the
acquisition of a fee interest is dependent upon all the facts and circumstances
and the statutory intent.38 In view of the breadth of powers authorized in
5 (b) with respect to vested property, vesting may be held to effect a divest-
ment of title of the owner,39 but whether this is to be returned to him through
a divesting order or whether vesting is to lead other later acts, which may
or may not eventuate in confiscation of vested property, is dependent upon
legislation and executive policy as yet undetermined. For the present, vest-
ing, and the exercise of the powers over vested property which 5 (b) permits,
ensures that alf productive resources controlled by the enemy shall be utilized
in the most effective manner.
3241 STAT. 35 (1919), 50 U. S. C. § 9 (Appendix).
3341 STAT. 977 (1920), 50 U. S. C. § 9 (Appendix).
3442 STAT. 1511 (1923), 50 U. S. C. § 9 (Appendix).
3545 STAT. 254 (1928).36Holtzoff, Enemy Patents in the United States (1932) 26 Af. J. INT. L. 272.37Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179 Atl. 536 (1935).38Ross v. Trustees of University of Wyoming, 31 Wyo. 464, 228 Pac. 642 (1924);
Busick v. Busick, 65 Ind. App. 655, 115 N. E. 1025 (1917).39United States v. Borax Consolidated Ltd., et al., - F. Supp. - (N. D. Cal. 1945).




"DIVESTING" AND POST-WAR SETTLEMENTS
A hitherto neglected aspect of foreign funds control is that of its relation
to the post-war settlements. As stated in the brief of the United States in
the Polish Relief case:
From the very inception of freezing control, one year and eight months
before Pearl Harbor, this Government has been concerned with blocked
assets from the point of view of any post-war settlement. This country
even then was interested in having a voice at any peace conference-
whether or not we entered the war. One of the issues that may have to
be decided at that conference is what happens .to "blocked assets."
Obviously this Government has a vital interest in the disposition of that
problem.40
This same issue applies even more sharply to property vested by the
Alien Property Custodian under 5(b) of the Act.4 ' Yet 5(b), and, for that
matter, the other provisions of the Act, are silent on any approach to this
problem. Obviously no solution can be adopted in advance of the peace
treaties.' But consideration of the legislative problems involved should not
for that reason be ignored and delayed.
No power would seem to exist in the custodian to divest property once
properly vested, except as a part of the relinquishment of freezing control
generally under presidential and congressional direction. The custodian has
recognized this in his divesting orders issued to date, which have been limited
to cases of "mistake of fact." 4
NATURE OF THE OFFICE OF ALIEN PROPERTY. CUSTODIAN
The 5 (b) powers can be, and were in fact originally, reposed in another
body than the present Office of Alien Property Custodian. They were first
delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury and administration of all foreign
property control questions under a single direction or authority was thus
preserved. 43 But in Order 9095, as amended by Order 9193,44 this was re-
4OBrief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 13.41Note that the British counterpart of the Act recites that its purpose lies in "pre-
serving enemy property in contemplation of arrangements to be made at the conclusion
of peace," Trading with the Enemy Act, 1939, 2 & 3 GEO. 6, c. 89.42E.g., Divesting Order 72, 9 FED. REG. 13817 (1944).43Memorandum of the President of February 12, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 1409 (1942).
447 FED. REG. 1971 and 5205 (1942). Order 9095, as thus amended, will be referred
to herein as "Order 9095." This Order reads in part as follows:
"By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution, by the First War
Powers Act, 1941, by the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917,




voked and a system of dual direction and authority was estallished. This
Order established the Office of Alien Property Custodian within the Office
for Emergency Management, the head of which was to be an Alien Property
Custodian. The Executive power to create this new Office was declared to
be based on "the Constitution," "the First War Powers Act, 1941," and
"the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, as amended." Obvi-
ously so broad a recitation of authority is by itself of little help in deter-
mining the nature and functions of the office so created. Yet, at the outset
of the Order and without any preliminary explanation, we find the Alien
Property Custodian so identified being "authorized and empowered to take
such action as he deems necessary in the national interest." It is clear that
this authorization cannot be construed to permit him to range the entire
field of, the various sources of authority mentioned. We must therefore look
to later language in the Order if we are to determine his exact role. The
Order subsequently provides that his authority is to include, but not to be
limited to, "the power to direct, manage, supervise, control or vest, with
respect to" six separately defined categories of foreign property. These
terms, these powers, are a part of the system of the control and use of foreign
property contemplated by 5(b) of the Act and it accordingly becomes clear
that the custodian is to aid in carrying out that system.
The scope of the authority of the present custodian under Order 9095 is
quite different from that of the "custodian" whose appointment is permitted
under 6 of the Act as enacted in World War 1.4 5 The domain of the present
custodian in part coincides with,, in part exceeds, and in part falls short of,
that of the "custodian" referred to in Section 6. He can reach property which
"Executive Order No. 9095 of March 11, 1942, is amended to read as follows:
"1. There is hereby established in the Office for Emergency Management
of the Executive Office of the President the Office of Alien Property Custodian,
at the head of which shall be an Alien Property Custodian appointed by the
President....
"2. The Alien Property Custodian is authorized and empowered to take
such action as he deems necessary in the national interest, including, but not
limited to, the power to direct, manage, supervise, control or vest, with
respect to :"
The Order then lists six classes of property in respect of which the custodian may
exercise such powers.
45§ 6 reads in part as follows:
"The President is authorized to appoint, prescribe the duties of, and fix the
salary (not to exceed $5,000 per annum) of an official to be known as the alien property
custodian, who shall be empowered to receive all money, and property in the United
States due or belonging to an enemy, or ally of enemy, which may be paid, conveyed,
transferred, assigned, or delivered to said custodian under the provisions of this Act;
and to hold, administer, and account for the same under the general direction of the
President and as provided in this Act."
[Vol. 31
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was beyond the power of the old "custodian" (e.g., patents, trademarks,
copyrights, ships and certain business enterprises of any "foreign national,"
whether or not an "enemy" or "ally of enemy"), and yet be unable to reach
property (e.g., cash, currencies, deposits, credits, securities, etc. of an
"enemy") which the latter possessed by statutory authority.
Nowhere in Order 9095 is there a reference as such to the power of seizure
of enemy property authorized by 7 (c), yet, significantly, the delegation of
authority to the "custodian" in World War I expressly recited 7(c) and the
other sections of the Act which he was empowered to administer.46 Order
9095 uses terms applicable within the framework of control of foreign prop-
erty created pursuant to 5(b) and refers only to that section and 3(a) in its
various specific delegations of authority. The entire structure of the Order
suggests that its establishment of the "Office of Alien Property Custodian"
was pursuant to 5(b) only and no appointment of a "custodian" was made
under the authority of 6 of the Act and with the power of seizure specified
in 7(c). Section 5(b) of the Act provides that the "agency or person" in
whom foreign property is to "vest" shall be designated by the president.
The present custodian could very readily have been the "official to be known
as the alien property custodian" referred to in 6 of the Act, but it is ques-
tionable whether the present custodian is such "official" and is delegated with
the powers elsewhere stipulated in the Act to be exercised by suchi "official."
Clearly he possesses the power to "vest" certain foreign property, that is, to
assume possession of and title to such foreign property, and to exercise
certain of the 5(b) powers over it as provided in the Order. But it is
doubtful whether he possesses, or can possess consistently with the purposes
of 5(b), the power of seizure under 7(c) if subject to the limitations of 7(c)
and of the other provisions of the Act.
It was.apparently the intention of the Order to limit the custodian's func-
tions to the control of business enterprises, and productive properties gener-
ally, in which an enemy interest exists. It is his. duty to ensure that this
type of property is managed in the manner most effective in the conduct of
the war effort. The Secretary of the Treasury, on the other hand, is pri-
marily concerned with the control of liquid foreign assets,--cash, securities,
etc., including the regulation of foreign exchange transactions.47 The exact
46ExFc. ORDER No. 2729-A, October 12, 1917. § 7(c) authorizes the custodian to
seize property of "an enemy or ally of enemy."47See Hearing before Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary, House
of Representatives, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. No. 4840, amended and reintro-
duced as H. R. No. 5031, Ser. No. 18, p. 73; ANNUAL REPORT, OFFicE OF ALIEN
PROPERTY CUSTODIAN, FIscAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 1944, pp. 2-3; but see Execu-
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nature of the present Office is perhaps best stated by the custodian himself
in a letter to the president:
The present Office is a new agency, created to deal with foreign-owned
property problems arising from our participation in the present war.48
If he were limited to the powers of a custodian appointed pursuant to Sec-
tion 6 and denied the power to seek out enemy property interests in whatever
form they might lie which the flexible provisions of 5 (b) permits, the results
would be disastrous to the delicately articulated system of control and use
of foreign property now established. Clearly the present custodian does not
possess the power of seizure under 7(c).
The present Alien Property Custodian, is, however, successor in responsi-
bility for enemy property matters remaining from World War I. The Office
of the "custodian" then created pursuant to 6 of the Act was abolished
in 1934 and its functions and property were transferred to the Department
of Justice.40 By Order 9142 these were on April 21, 1942, transferred to
the present custodian. 50 His jurisdiction in this connection is limited to
property seized as the result of World War I which has not been returned
to its former owners, 51 and does not involve per se a reconstitution of the
old office of the "custodian." 52
THE ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN AN ENEMY PROPERTY ADMINISTRATOR
It has been noted that the title of the present "Alien Property Custodian"
is something of a misnomer. He is not the "custodian" referred to in 6 of
the Act though he has many powers which are equivalent to those of such
custodian. He is more than a mere custodian in the common law sense, since
he exercises the powers of use and sale of vested property. He is not limited
to enemy property, for he may theoretically reach certain classes of foreign
property without regard to whether it is that of an enemy or even of an
alien friend.53 The custodian thus has overlapping roles'which might as well
tive Order No. 9567, June 8, 1945, 10 FED. REG. 6917, authorizing the vesting of liquid
assets of Germany and Japan.
48ANNUAL REPORT, OFFICE OF ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN, MARCH 11, 1942 TO
JUNE 30, 1943, p. 1. Italics herein are the writer's except where otherwise indicated.4 9EXEC. ORDER No. 6694, May 1, 1934.
507 FED. REG. 2985 (1942).
5 1ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 7.
52 Dom E, TRADING WITH THE ENEmY IN WORLD WAR II (1943) 264. Accord as to
the conclusion reached in this section that the custodian's powers are limited to 5(b),
McNulty, Contitutionality of Alien Property Controls (1945) 11 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROD. 134, 145-146.53Terms herein such as "enemy," "enemy property" and "enemy interest" are not
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obe characterized by the titles "Enemy Property Administrator" or "Foreign
Property Control Agent'; as by his present title.
The amendment of 5(b) by the First War Powers Act, 1941, bad as its
purpose to permit the widest flexibility possible in the treatment of enemy
property, ranging from mere sequestration (i.e., "held") to active use (i.e.,
"used, administered . . .or otherwise dealt with") and finally to liquidation
(i.e., "liquidated, sold"). r4 But the role of the custodian with respect to
vested property, so far as the terms of Order 9095 are concerned, may well
be viewed as primarily managerial and supervisory, with the power to use
and dispose of vested property being shared with the Secretary of the
Treasury. Certainly the Order is far from clear in indicating the exact scope
of authority intended to be delegated to the custodian and the functions to be
assumed by him, when considered against the background of the statute and
the wide range of powers contemplated by it.
The delegation of authority to the custodian under Order 9095 presents
a curious inversion in the use of terms in the Order as contrasted with the
statute. 5(b) permits of a delegation of specifically enumerated and limited
powers with respect to vested property (i.e., "such . . . property shall be
necessarily used in the strict sense of the defined terms "enemy" or "national of a
designated enemy country."5 4SEN. REP. No. 911, supra note 4, at 2:
"While existing law permits the Government' to prevent transactions, it is
now necessary for the Government to be able to affirmatively compel the use
and application of foreign property in a manner consistent with the interests
of the United States.
"Section 301 would remedy this situation. It gives the President flexible
powers, operating through such agency as he might choose, to deal compre-
hensively with the many problems that surround alien property or its owner-
ship or control in the manner most effective in each particular case."
H. R. REP. No. 1507, supra note 4, at 3:
"At present the Government exercises supervision over transactions in foreign
property, either by prohibiting such transactions or by permitting them on con-
dition and under license. It is, therefore, a system which can prevent trans-
actions in foreign property prejudicial to the best interests of the United States,
but it is not a system which can affirmatively compel the use and application
of foreign property in those interests.
"Section 301 remedies that situation by adding to the existing freezing con-
trol, in substance, the powers contained in the Trading with the Enemy Act
with respect to alien property, extending-those powers, and adding a flexibility
of control which experience under the original act and the recent experience
under freezing control would have demonstrated to be advisable. The provi-
sions of section 301 would permit the establishment of a complete system of
alien property treatment. It vests flexible powers in the President, operating
through such agency or agencies as he might choose, to deal with the problems
that surround alien property or its ownership or control in the manner deemed
most effective in each particular case. In this respect the bill avoids the rigidity
and inflexibility which characterized the alien property custodian law enacted
during the last war."
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held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with") and°
prescribes a standard for their exercise (i.e., "in the interest of and for
the benefit of the United States"). But the phrase establishing the standard
of conduct for the appointee under 5 (b) becomes in the Order the conduit
for the delegation of power to the appointee, for the Order empowers the
custodian "to take such action as he deems necessary in the national interest,
including, but not limited to, the power to direct, manage, supervise, con-
trol or vest." To what extent does this empowerment permit the exercise
of those further powers referred to expressly in 5(b) under which vested
property may be "held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise
dealt with," which are not mentioned as such in the delegation of authority
made in the Order?
The answer to this question lies in part in an analysis of the terms of the
grant itself and in part in the remaining context of the Order. Solution will
not be found in a meticulous comparison of the terms of the statute and of
the Order, for the Order uses in this connection only one of the relevant
terms in the statute defining the 5(b) powers. The phrase "direct, manage,
supervise, control or vest" clearly evinces an intent to grant the power to
vest and to exercise supervisory and regulatory authority with respect to
vested property. The question whether the custodian was intended to carry
out subject to no other superior or concurrent authority the more radical and
equally important powers of use, liquidation and sale was equally before the
drafter of the Order and the fact that these were left unmentioned is not
without significance. It would have been a simple matter to have settled this
question in charting the custodian's functions by. an express grant of these
powers instead of leaving it to implication in the phrase "to take such action
as he deems necessary in the national interest." What action under what
statutory or other authority? The president cites "the Constitution," "the
First War Powers Act, 1941," and "the Trading with the Enemy Act of
October 6, 1917, as amended," as the sources of his authority in making
this direction to the custodian, with the result ihat up to this point in the
Order the custodian is free to act "as he deems necessary" so long as he con-
fines himself to these wide-flung sources of authority. So vast a grant of
authority is obviously absurd and unintended. Hence, what are the "duties
and functions" which the Order elsewhere assumes he has been directed to
carry out ?
The first clue to an answer to this question lies in the next immediately
following phrase of the Order "including, but not limited to, the power to
direct, manage, supervise, control or vest." One of these terms, i.e., "vest,"
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will be found in 5(b) of the Act. Elsewhere in the Order other references
appear to 5 (b) and to the structure of foreign property control erected under
it from which an intent to proceed under and carry out the provisions of
5(b) can clearly be demonstrated. The issue is accordingly narrowed to
the question whether the recital of the limited powers to "direct, manage,
supervise, control" is merely confirmatory of part of a broader general grant
under which the custodian, free from any coordinate or superior authority,
was to exercise the full range of the 5(b) powers or whether such recital
limits the custodian's powers, in effect, to those of vesting, supervision and
control.
It must,be remembered that the powers delegated to the custodian apply
to six specific categories of property, three of which include property of any
foreign national, whether he be alien friend or enemy., The Secretary of the
Treasury may by Section 11 of Order 9095 extend his sphere of control
established in Order 8389 to any new foreign country not mentioned therein
after consultation with the Secretary of State. This delegation of authority
to the Secretary of the Treasury has as its statutory sanction the fact that
the last amendment of 5(b) deleted the limiting phrase "as defined by the
President" in the portion thereof from which the Secretary's authority over
foreign funds control is derived. 5 Subject possibly to a similar prior con-
sultation with the Secretary of State-as to which the Order (i.e., Section
11) is not quite clear-the custodian himself, under the order, may appar-
ently determine the foreign countries and nationals thereof whose property
of the three classes in question shall come under his control. For example,
there is nothing to prevent the custodian from vesting, say, a ship of a
British national or a patent of a Canadian national, inasmuch as each such
national is a "foreign national."
The breadth of this power would tend to support the conclusion that
the failure to expressly grant the power to use and dispose of vested prop-
erty in the public interest was intentional, and was with a view to its being
withheld from the custodian. Such a conclusion does not necessarily lead
to the result that no delegation of such authority was made in the Order.
Section 3 of Order 9095 delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury, subject
5sPrior to the First War Powers Act, 1941, the Executive powers to regulate trans-
actions in foreign exchange were applicable to "property in which any foreign 'state
or a national or a political subdivision thereof, as defined by the President, has any
interest." 54 STAT. 179. After such Act they were applicable to "any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest." Admittedly, the
omission of the above italicized words can as well indicate an intent to delete mere
surplusage, with no change in meaning, as an intent to permit the power to define
the foreign countries involved to be a delegable power.
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to the other provisions of the Order, all authority conferred upon the presi-
dent by 5(b), thereby granting to the Secretary any power withheld from
the custodian. The practical difficulties involved are settled by Section 4
of the Order under which the Secretary of the Treasury and the custodian
are empowered "jointly . . . to prescribe from time to time, regulations,
rulings, and instructions to carry out the purposes of the Executive Order."
Rence, the Order is susceptible of the interpretation that the power to use
and dispose of property vested in the custodian is to be exercised in such
manner as the Secretary and the custodian may together determine. Quite
possibly by reason of the tremendous value of the assets involved;56 the
president felt that the use or sale or other disposition of foreign property
should be subject to the general control of his fiscal officer and that in this
respect the Secretary should be the final policy-making authority with regard
to both enemy and non-enemy foreign property.57
A further delegation of authority to the custodian under 3(a) and 5 (b)
of the Act is made in Sections 6 and 12 of Order 9095, but the purpose of
these grants is to implement him with the necessary authority to "enable"
him to carry out his "functions" or "duties and functions" under the Order. s
The scope of these "functions" is specifically laid down at the outset of the
Order in Section 2. Sections 6 and 12 are not "catch-all" clauses, granting
all authority under 5(b) of the Order not otherwise granted,; Section 3 of
the Act rather appears to serve such a purpose and to grant all residual
56Nearly $8,000,000,000 of foreign-owned property in the United States has been
subjected to Government control of which the custodian has vested approximately
$197,000,000 of property and some 45,000 patents and patent applications as well as
200,000 copyrights and 410 trademarks. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 14-15. A
compilation based on Treasury Department figures gives $8,500,000,000 as the value of
blocked assets. N. Y. Times, March 6, 1945, p' 4.5 7Cf. BLACELY AND "OATMAN, ADMIsTRATIV LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION
(1934) 83-84, noting that the approval of rules by some agency other than that which
makes them is a fairly common method of control and achieves a "harmonizing of
action not possible otherwise."
58§ 6 of Order 9095 provides in part as follows:
"To enable the Alien Property Custodian to carry out his functions under
this Executive Order, there are hereby delegated to the Alien Property Cus-
todian or any person, agency, or instrumentality designated by him all powers
and authority conferred upon me by section 5(b) of the Trading with the
Enemy Act, as amended."
§ 12 of the Order 9095 contains the following provision:
"... to the extent necessary and appropriate to enable them to perform their
duties and functions hereunder, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Alien
Property Custodian shall be deemed to be authorized to exercise severally any
and all authority, rights, privileges and powers conferred on the President by
sections 3(a) and 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6,
1917, as amended and by sections 301 and 302 of Title III of the First War
Powers Act, 1941, approved December 18, 1941."
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authority to the Secretary of the Treasury. Sections 6 and 12 do not en-
large the field of the custodian's authority; their declared purpose is to
grant him the necessary powers to make that authority effective. Thus these
sections do not necessarily involve a grant to the custodian of the powers
of use and sale if not granted under the chart of his powers made in Section 2.
The apparent freedom of the custodian under the Order to determine
the foreign countries and nationals thereof whose property of certain classi-
fications, such as patents, shall be subject to his supervision, whether or
not such countries may be "designated enemy countries," raises certain
questions as to whether 5(b) permits of such a broad delegation of power.
In so far as purely regulatory acts of the custodian are concerned, it is
believed that the delegation of the power to designate the foreign countries
and nationals thereof whose property is to come under such regulation is
sanctioned by 5 (b). 59 But when the issue is one of vesting, with all its con-
sequences, 5(b) seems to require the president to determine each foreign
country whose property is to come under the system of control through vest-
ing and to designate the agency or person to exercise such control. It
provides that "any property or interest of any foreign country or national
thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms, directed by the President,
in such agency or person as may be designated from time to time by the
President." Her6 the issue is not one of the exercise of the powers of the
president "through any agency that he may designate," as provided in an-
other connection in 5(b), 60 but the validity of a delegation to the custodian
of the power to determine not only what specific property shall be vested
but also the foreign countries whose property shall be subject to vesting. To
the extent the custodian has confined his acts of vesting of foreign property
to property which is found to be enemy property, it seems probable that such
acts would be sustained as acts in performance of and within the war powers
of Congress,61 notwithstanding this technical deficiency of a delegation per-
haps otherwise too broad in its scope. But when the issue involved is the
further delegation by the president of the power to determine what non-
enemy property shall be affected -by vesting control, it is questionable, in
the light of the limitations imposed in this connection by 5(b), whether the
56See note 55 supra.6oCf. Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 245, 41 Sup. Ct. 293, 296 (1921) (personal
determination by president of enemy ownership not required).
61U. S. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 11; Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 110, 3 L. ed.
504 (1814); Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 20 L. ed. 135 (1871) ; Stoehr v.
Wallace, supra note 59; Alexewicz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 181 Misc. 181,
43 N. Y. S. (2d) 713 (Broome Cty., 1943) (constitutionality of 5(b) sustained).
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Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation case 62 would sustain such a redelegation
of the 5 (b) powers the exercise of which is so provocative of consequences
in the conduct of our foreign relations. So' far, the courts have sustained
only the delegation by Congress to the president of the "freezing" powers
under 5(b). 63
The custodian has nevertheless adopted a comprehensive policy of selling
or "transferring vested property to private enterprise," 64 thereby effectually
liquidating the enemy interest in our economic structure. In General Order
No. 26 regulations were established governing the sale of vested property
without reference to the Secretary. 65 The disposition of the proceeds of such
sales creates something of a dilemma for the custodian. On the one hand,
consistently with his apparent purpose that vesting orders shall not ipso
facto be confiscatory, it is provided in his vesting orders that "such property
and any or all of the proceeds thereof shall be held in an appropriate account
or accounts, pending further determination of the Alien Property Cus-
todian."' 66 But 12 of the Act, if applicable, requires that the "alien property
custodian shall forthwith deposit in the Treasury of the United States, as
hereinbefore provided, the pr6ceeds of any such property or rights so sold
by him."
62United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 57 Sup. Ct. 216
(1936).63United States v. Von Clemm, 136 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943). See generally
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935); A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935).
6 4ANNuAL REPORT, mspra note 48, at 70. The power of the custodian to sell vested
property is now being tested in Uebersee Finanz-Korporation v. Markham (Civil Action
No. 26543, U. S. D. C., Dist. of Columbia).
658 FED. REG. 7628 (1943).
66Cf. Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U. S. 74, 79, 56 Sup. Ct. 15, 18 (1935),
which, in view of the conclusion reached infra that 9(a) relief is inapplicable against a
vesting under 5(b), would seem to require the custodian to preserve the identity of
vested property or the proceeds thereof in order to save the adequacy of remedies of
claimants against the-custodian. The custodian has stated:
"In the light of conflicting opinions which now obtain regarding the ultimate
disposition of controlled property, ranging from approval of outright confisca-
tion to complete compensation of the forrper owners, it is perhaps necessary
to add at this point that the program of converting vested property into cash
does not in any way prejudice the character of any ultimate settlement which
will appear appropriate in the light of conditions and policies prevailing after
the war. The original owners are in general interested nQt in specific pieces
of property but in the economic value of their property as a source of income.
The current market price of any property represents the best estimate of its
economic value. The vested properties are in general to be sold at the best
prices which can be obtained under current market c6nditions. Hence our
program of selling vested properties is not incompatible with a possible decision
to provide full compensation of the former owners." ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 48, at 70.
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The use of vested property by the custodian, aside from the management
of vested business enterprises, has largely manifested itself in the licensing
of vested patents. The custodian has made the claim that "by delegation of
Presidential authority under Section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy
Act, as amended by the First War Powers Act, 1941, the Custodian is di-
rected to hold, use, administer, or ctherwise deal with vested (i.e., seized)
patents 'in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States'." 67 The
language is that of 5(b), rather than that of Order 9095, and it has been
seen to be open to question whether the language of the Order permits of the
claimed delegation; if included in the Order, it must be found in some theory
of implied or inferred powers.6 8
The custodian's policy with respect to the licensing of vested patents was
first made public in a letter from the custodian to the president, dated
December 7, 1942, the text of which was released on December 8 by the
White House.69 In this letter the custodian states that the president has
"directed the Office of the Alien Property Custodian to seize all patents
controlled by the enemy, regardless of nominal ownership, and to make these
patents freely available to American industry, first for war purposes of the
United Nations, and second for general use in the national interest." In the
same letter the means to be used to attain these objectives were outlined.
Licenses were to be granted for the life of the patents upon payment of a
nominal fee, subject to no royalty in the case of enemy patents, and subject
to reasonable royalty only after six months after the termination of the war
in the case of patents of nationals of enemy-occupied countries. Recently the
custodian granted the Government a royalty-free release and license under
all enemy-owned patents vested by the custodian. 70
Whatever criticism may be made of this policy,71 it is clear, therefore, that
the custodian's patent licensing policy has presidential approval, though no
'order specifically authorizing that policy has been made. But in embarking
upon a program of this magnitude and complexity and involving property
of such value to the United States as well as to its former owners (if com-
pensation to such owners should ever be considered), it is believed that
the custodian's authority therefor should have been more clearly set forth
6 7 PATENTS AT WORK, A STATEMENT OF POLICY (Alien Property Custodian, 1943) 5.
68Cf. discussion on inferred powers of administrative agencies in Pound, The Chal-
lenge of the Adminstrative Process (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 121; Field, Rationing Sfs-
pension Orders: A Reply to Dean Pound, id. at 385; and Smith, Comment on Mr.
Field's Reply for the O.P.A., id. at 390.69N. Y. J. Comm., Dec. 9, 1942, at 10.
7010 FED. REG. 8271 (1945).
71See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssocilAoN (1943) 456-457.
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than it now is in Order 9095. The necessity of such a further implementing
of the custodian's powers is emphasized by the provisions of 10 of the Act,
if applicable, which contemplate the licensing of enemy patents against sub-
stantial royalties.
Though the policy is in terms carried out under a system of licensing, it
should be appreciated that its real effect is that of expunging the patents
involved for the period of royalty-free use. Since the value of a patent lies
in the right therein granted to exclude others from the manufacture, sale
and use of the patented invention, permitting substantially all applicants to
engage in such manufacture, sale and use upon a royalty-free basis is tanta-
mount to destruction of the right.7 2 In practical effect, the patents become
a part of the public domain during the period when they are available
royalty-free.
THE ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN AS FOREIGN PROPERTY CONTROL AGENT
-For three categories of foreign property in the United States the cus-
todian's powers under Order 9095 are not limited to "nationals of designated
enemy countries" but, as has been noted, extend to "any foreign country or
national thereof." In respect of that property, which includes, among other
things, patents, trademarks and copyrights, the custodian is not limited to
interests of nationals of countries with which we are at war, but may extend
to any blocked country. Within this enlarged field of blocked, but not neces- -
sarily enemy, interests, the custodian's control has been primarily that of
carrying out the regulatory functions formerly carried out by the Secretary
of the Treasury. For the sake of simplicity an examination of his acts in' this
connection will be confined to the matter of patents.
In his General License No. 72, the Secretary of the Treasury established
regulations governing the obtaining of United States patents and patent
applications in which a blocked national had an interest and also the obtaining
of patents in blocked countries. Following the making of Order 9095,
Section 2(d) of which authorized the custodian to take control over patents
and patent applications "in which any foreign country or national thereof
has any interest," the Secretary amended his General License No. 72 so as
to relinquish his control over such United States patents and patent applica-
tions to the custodian.7 3 The custodian at the same time established by his
General Order No. 11 and regulations thereunder his control over the ob-
72Ibd.
737 FED. REG. 9480 (1942).,
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taining of such United States patents and patent applications. 4 On the other
hand, the Secretary, by General License No. 72A, retained his jurisdiction
over patents issued by a foreign country in which a blocked interest exists,
and permitted under certain restrictions any person not a blocked national
to prosecute and receive blocked foreign patents. 75
APPLICABILITY TO THE PRESENT CUSTODIAN OF THE TRADING WITH
THE ENEMY ACT (OTHER THAN SEcTION 5(b) )-REMEDIES
AGAINST THE CUSTODIAN
In reporting on the proposed amendment to 5 (b) in the First War Powers
Act, 1941, the House Committee said with respect to the status of the Act:
Some sections of that act are still in effect. Some sections have termi-
nated, and there is doubt of the effectiveness of other sections. 73
One of the sections of the Act whose status seems to be in doubt is 9(a).
This provides a means for a person who is "not an enemy or ally of enemy"
to institute suit against the "custodian" to recover property mistakenly seized
by him. Certain recent decisions in suits against the present custodian for
the return of vested property have been sustained on the theory that they
are sanctioned by 9(a), since otherwise 5(b) would be unconstitutional for
failure to provide an adequate remedy for the return of property of American
citizens and alien friends mistakenly seized.77 In so holding, it is believed
that they have unnecessarily added to the confusion as to the applicability
of the sections of the Act, other than 5 (b), to the present custodian. Though
the remedy provided in 9(a) was held by the Supreme Court in Stoehr v.
Wallace78 to be sufficiently adequate to save the constitutionality of seizures
under 7(c), it does not follow- that other judicial remedies available to the
aggrieved citizen or alien friend in respect to a vesting under 5 (b) may not
also be adequate to save its constitutionality. Since the decision in Stoehr v.
Wallace there has been a great growth in the body of administrative law
and change in the attitude of the courts towards adminstrative agencies.
Methods of judicial supervision over administrative agencies and the princi-
747 FED. REa. 9475 (1942).
75 See note 71 supra.76H. R. REP. No. 1507, supra note 4, at 2. See Lourie, The Trading with the Enemy
Act (1943) 42 MicH. L. REv. 205, 233.77Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, 49 F. Supp. 215 (S. D. N. Y. 1943), complaint
dismissed upon showing plaintiff was a foreign "national," 55 F. Supp. 906 (S. D.
N. Y. 1944); Duisberg v. Crowley, 54 F. Supp. 365 (D. N. J. 1944); Standard Oil
Co. v. Markham, 57 F. Supp. 332 (S. D. N. Y. 1944); but cf. Stern v. Newton, 39
N. Y. S. (2d) 593 (N. Y. Cty., 1943).78See note 60 mipra.
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ples applicable to judicial relief against the acts of such agencies have since
been greatly elaborated and clarified. The courts, in the exercise of their
broad equity powers and without express statutory direction, have granted
injunctive or other equitable relief against the imposition of wrongful ad-
ministrative orders. 79 And such equitable remedies are not "limited to the
cases in which the Constitution is deemed to require judicial review."80
As a safeguard for the protection of the interests of American citizens
and alien friends which might be prejudiced by acts of vesting, both the
Secretary of the Treasury, during his brief interim' of authority to vest,81
and the custodian8 2 established procedures for the presentation, hearing and
decision of claims by such persons. The claims procedure of the custodian
provides for notice of hearing and of decision rendered, the right to be
represented by counsel or otherwise, the making of a record of the proceed-
ings and of findings, and an examination of the record by the custodian before
rendering decision. The procedure, at least in so far as its form is concerned,
seems to preserve the basic constituti6nal requirements for administrative
review.83
In the light of the system of administrative relief provided by the cus-
todian and the non-statutory judicial remedies available, it is not believed
necessary that the relief against mistaken seizures provided for in 9(a) of
the Act must be held to be applicable to a vesting under 5(b) in order to
save its constitutionality. The absence of any provision in 5(b) for judicial
relief against wrongful vesting has, with other aspects of 5(b), led one
authority to the view that this section cannot be considered to envisage the
taking and use of foreign property for the public benefit as under an eminent
domain statute.84 But the taking of property for public use may occur
otherwise than through a condemnation proceeding8 5 And it is well settled
7 9 CHAMBERLAIN, DOWLING AND HAYS, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL AD-
MINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 175-182; FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1941) 80-82; BLACHLY AND OATMAN, Op.
cit. supra note 57, at 185-195; cf. 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (20) and 250, cases cited infra
note 86.
8 0 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ox ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURE (1941) 81.
817 FED. REG. 1021 (1942).
827 FED. REG. 2290 (1942).
83Cf. Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 58 Sup. Ct. 773 (1938) ; Timken-Detroit
Axle Co. v. Alma Motor Co., 144 F. (2d) 714, 719 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944); ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR, ASSOCIATION (1943) 452.84Dulles, loc. cit. s'upra note 17, at 251-252; contra McNulty, loc. cit. supra note 52.85Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 52 Sup. Ct. 267 (1932) ; United States v. North
American Transportation & Trading Co., 253 U. S. 330, 40 Sup. Ct. 518 (1920);
United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349 (1903).
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that no statutory provision for payment of compensation is necessary, inas-
much as when the United States takes private property for public use it
impliedly contracts to make just compensation therefor in view of the Fifth
Amendment.8 6 Hence, the silence of 5(b) as to compensation for takings
made under it does not import its unconstitutionality. The Act of March 9,
1933, in which 5(b) was recast into substantially its present -structure, also
empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to requisition gold.'t The con-
stitutionality of this was sustained notwithstanding the absence of provision
for compensation.88 When vesting only is in issue, rather than sale or liqui-
dation or other acts involving damage, it may be that a claimant should be
required to exhaust his administrative remedy before the custodian before
invoking judicial relief.8 9 But when the claimant's property is threatened
with loss or damage by virtue of acts of the custodian, the court "would
have full power, and be under a compelling duty, by way of coercion upon
the Custodian to preserve the property intact." 90
Relief under 9(a) is, moreover, limited by its terms to property trans-
fered to or seized by the "official" or "custodian" whose office is created under
6 of the Act, and it has been seen that the present custodian is not that
"official." Hence, the fact that 7(c) provides that the relief provided in
9(a) shall be the "sole relief and remedy" of claimants against the "cus-
todian," does not act as a bar to the resort to nonstatutory remedies available
to persons aggrieved by the present custodian's acts taken under the authority
of 5(b). These former sections are part of an entirely different structure
of enemy property control from that erected under 5(b).91 For example,
9(a is available to "any person not an enemy or ally of enemy." This
would permit a person who might not be technically an "enemy" yet.in fact
a "national" of a "designated enemy country," because of the breadth of'
these latter terms as against the relatively narrow statutory meaning of
8sCampbell v. United States, 266 U. S. 368, 45 Sup. Ct. 115 (1924); United States
v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645, 5 Sup. Ct. 306 (1884).
8748 STAT. 1 (1933), 50 U. S. C. § 5 (Appendix).
86Campbell v. Chase Nat. Bank, 5 F. Supp. 156 (S. D. N. Y. 1933), aff'd 71 F.
(2d) 669 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. den. 293 U. S. 592, 55 Sup. Ct. 108 (1934).89Stern v. Newton, supra note 77; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S.
41, 58 Sup. Ct. 459 (1938)'; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, g9 Sup.
Ct. 67 (1909) ; Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (1939) 48 YALE L. J.
981; cf. Hartmann v. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 55 F. Supp. 801, 810
(E. D. Pa. 1944) (review of "freezing" of bank account by Secretary of Treasury).
9OSee Standard Oil Co. v. Markham, supra note 77, at 334.
9'Cf. DoMKE, op cit supra note 52, at 262. Judge Knox, in Standard Oil Co. v.
Markham, mpra note 77, at 334, considers the limitations of 7(c) and 9(f) as involving
"situations that arise when the Custodian has made disposition of seized property prior
to the time at which claimant, under the privilege given him by 9(a) institutes suit
against the Custodian for the purpose of reacquiring his property."
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"eneny," to sue for the recovery of vested property under the authority
of 9(a). The plaintiff in the Duisberg case quite properly limited his allega-
tion of non-enemy character to the statement that he was a United States
citizen, ignoring any requirement of adducing proof that he was not a
"foreign national" within the meaning of 5(b) and Orders 8389 and 9095
pursuant thereto.92 On the other hand, the court in the Draeger Shvipping
Company case, without sanction of 9(a) as such but reading it and 5(b) as,
in harmony, required the plaintiff to prove that it was not such a "foreign
national." 3 Though no other course was open to the court, if the conse-
quences of its holding were not to subvert the purposes of 5 (b) by requiring
the return of property falling within the sphere of control of 5 (b) and yet
outside the system of seizure of enemy property established under World
War I legislation, in establishing the requirement of the furnishing of such
proof by the plaintiff the plain direction of 9(a) that the plaintiff need only
show that he is not "an enemy or ally of enemy" was ignored. Yet if 9(a)
were held to be available as relief against action under 5(b), and were
strictly applied in accordance with its terms, the results would be so dis-
ruptive of the technique of control established under 5(b), as above seen,
as to lead 9(a) so to be adopted only in the most compelling circumstances.
The only such circumstance thus far advanced is that of saving the consti-
tutionality of 5(b), which has been shown to be without basis.9 4
REMEDIAL LEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS
It is of course recognized that the deficiencies and doubts in the present
structure of legislation and executive orders relating to enemy property is
but a necessary consequence of the press of legislation in the early days of
our participation in the war. When the need for action is paramount, time is
lacking for the creation of a nicely articulated legal structure to support steps
essential in the war effort. The flow of legislative authorization and execu-
tive delegation and direction is not always likely to pass through neatly
marked channels. But the task of amplifying existing legislation in order
to establish the necessary measures of protection and compensation required
by the Constitution and applicable treaties and principles of international
law, and of refining and supplementing the provisions of existing executive
orders in order to eliminate evident deficiencies, is one not to be indefinitely
postponed.
92Supra note 77.93Supra note 77.94Similar conclusions to those herein expressed will be found in McNulty, loc. cit.




Among the legislative problems awaiting consideration are the following:
1. Disposition of property held by the custodian. It is directed in 12 of
the Act that all property taken by the custodian (other than money, which
was to be deposited in the Treasury) was to be retained by him and after
the war enemy claims thereto were to be "settled as Congress shall direct."
The existing doubt as to the applicability of this section to property held
by the custodian should be removed by expressly declaring it to be so appli-
cable, subject to such exceptions as may be necessary to accommodate its
terms to the provisional character of the custodian's vesting orders and
other measures of the custodian designed to-preserve the identity of vested
property and the proceeds thereof. Alternatively, Congress should formulate
at least in general terms its policy as to the disposition to be made of such
property. The disposition of property of the value of that now taken over
by the custodian shoqld not any longer be left to his personal discretion and
determination of what may be "in the interest of and for the benefit of the
United States." Questions of constitutional requirements, international re-
sponsibility both under treaty and principles of international law, the arrange-
ments which may be made in the peace treaties, must all be weighed in
determining what is in "the interest . .. of the United States." On the one
hand, it seems established that international law condemns the confiscation
of enemy private property.95 Yet on the other hand, the courts of the United
States have been loath to deny that power exists in the sovereign to confiscate
the property of the enemy wherever found.Y6 But whether departure from
the rules of international law, aside from the retrogressive effect to such a
step,97 is in the best interests of the United States is at least open to question.
The adoption of such a precedent would inevitably have a long-term preju-
95Supra notes 29, 31; infra notes 96, 97, 99. See generally Sommerich, A Brief against
Confiscation (1945) 11 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 152.96Brown v. United States, mpra note 59; Miller v. United States, mpra note 61;
United States v. Chemical Foundation, supra note 30. But on the battle front itself
the Hague Regulations, according to which "private property cannot be confiscated,"
would seem to apply, inasmuch as their ratification by the United States stands in force
and effect. Hague Conventions of 1899 (1) and 1907 (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Regulations, Art. 46. SCOTT, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND
DECLA.RTIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 (1915) 123, 129, 131.
97Cf. Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property (1941) 35 Am. J. INT. L. 243, 254,
262, in Which the author concludes that the present world struggle, representing a
conflict between, on the one hand, an order seeking world supremacy in which the
system of private property is replaced by state regulation, and, on the other hand, the
existing system of equality between states and the protection of private property, will
decide the fate of the established rules of international law condemning the confiscation
of foreign property without compensation.
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dicial effect on the approximately thirteen and one-half billion dollars of
United States' investments abroad. 98 As stated by former Secretary Hull:
The confiscation of these private enemy funds by this Government and
their distribution to American nationals would react against the property
interests (some very large) of American nationals in other countries.
It would be an incentive to other governments to hold American private
property to satisfy claims of their nationals against this Government and
to pass upon such claims in their own way. It is important from my
point of view, therefore, that the United States should not depart in any
degree from its traditional attitude with respect to the sanctity of private
property within our territory whether such property belongs to nationals
of former enemy powers or to those of friendly powers. A departure
from that policy and the taking over of such property, except for a public
purpose and coupled with the assumption of liability to make just com-
pensation, would be fraught with disastrous results.99
One recently proposed bill would convert all vested property into cash
funds which would "become the absolute property oi the United States,"
leaving it to each country affected "to compensate its nationals for their
property... and to release the United States from any and all claims-arising
therefrom." The United States would then compensate its citizens for war
loss claims sustained since January 1, 1937.100 Another bill with a program
of using enemy funds and funds realized from sales of enemy property to
compensate American. nationals for war damage, proceeds on the assumption
-believed to be mistaken-that the custodian's acts of vesting have also
operated as seizures under 7(c) of the Act. 011
2. Relinquishment of foreign, property control generally. The problem
of the post-war control, of foreign property and foreign exchange is not
confined to the peace treaty settlements. The manifold problems incident to
the relinquishment of "freezing control," the continuance of some system of
foreign exchange control during the troubled days of world-wide conversion
to a peace-time economy and restoration of shattered trade areas demand
specific legislation. Section 5(b) was not designed to meet these problems
and its limitation to "time of war" or "national emergency" might prove
disastrous. The necessary tools must be at hand for use when needed and
consideration should be given to the enactment of the required legislation.
10 2
98N. Y. Times, March 6, 1944, p. 32. According to recent Treasury Department
TFR-300 and TFR-500 Census', enemy-owned assets in the United States total$441,000,000 against $1,775,000,000 American-owned assets in enemy countries. Hear-
ings, supra note 47, at 104.99Letter from Secretary Hull to Senator Capper, May 27, 1935, quoted in (1937)
31 Aaf. J. INT. L. 680.
10S. 1322, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
101H. R. 3371, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).10 2See Littauer, The Unfreesing of Foreign Funds (1945) 45 COL. L. Rav. 132.
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3. Remedies against thw custodian. H.R. 1530 was introduced by Repre-
sentative Sumners to settle the question of the availability of judicial relief
against acts of the custodian. 10 3 This provides a system of judicial and
administrative relief superseding altogether that of 9(a). The present doubt
as to whether the administrative remedies must first be exhausted by a person
claiming an interest in property vested in the custodian is removed by a
provision that it is only necessary, in order to institute suit againt the cus-
todian, that a claim shall have been filed by the plaintiff with the custodian.
The right to a return of the claimant's property through court order is, how-
ever, dependent upon his establishing that "he is not a foreign country or
national thereof as defined pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 5" of the
Act. Presumably this means that he must establish that he is not a blocked
national under Order 8389. For so long as he is a blocked national, the
foreign national is barred access to our courts and denied the return of his
property. Not even the grant of a general license by the Secretary of the
Treasury would relieve him of this disability. Many blocked nationals are,
nevertheless, alien friends, and some blocked countries, such as Poland, Nor-
way and The Netherlands, are members of the United Nations. Even a
"national" of the National Government of the Republic of China might be
barred from suit under this interpretation. 0 4 No valid reason for this dis-
crimination can be seen and to the extent that alien friends are denied the
relief to which they are entitled under the Constitution,10 5 this proposed
measure seems deficient. Though it saves the rights of alien friends under
28 U. S. C. A. Section 41(20) and 250, denial of this right of suit, with its
103H. R. 1530, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) formerly H. R. 5031, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1944).
104China is under Order 8389 a "foreign country designated in this Order" and a
blocked country, but by General License No. 60 the National Government of the
Republic of China was made a generally licensed national. Persons were, however,
thereby "generally licensed" only "to the extent they are acting for or on behalf of
such government."105Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481, 51 Sup. Ct. 229 (1931);
Littauer, loc. cit. supra note 9. Note that the custodian in his vesting orders permits
the filing-of claims on account thereof by any person except a "national of a designated
enemy country." The blanket prohibition of suit by blocked nationals would, among
others, affect resident alien enemies, of whose status the Supreme Court has recently
said: "The ancient rule against suits by resident alien enemies has survived only
so far as necessary to prevent use of the courts to accomplish a purpose which
might hamper our own war efforts or give aid to the enemy." Ex parte Kawato, 317
U. S. 69, 75, 63 Sup. Ct. 115, 118 (1942). The circumstances requiring "freezing
control" are not necessarily applicable to the same extent and for the same period of
time as those prohibiting resort to the courts. "Freezing control" and the consequent
creation of the status of blocked nationals will probably continue after the termination
of the war when traditionally the right of access to our courts is restored even as to
nonresident aliens of the former enemy. See § 7(b) of the Act.
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consequent loss of right to the return of the property itself, seems unnecessary
in view of the abundant measures of foreign property control already existing
to prevent the use of such a right in a manner helpful to enemy interests- 0 6
A recent and more limited version of this bill is H.R. 3750, which would
empower the custodian to return vested non-enemy property and which does
not expressly deny access to our courts against blocked nationals.10 7
Provisions of H.R. 1530 intended to provide for the payment of certain
debt claims have been strongly criticized. It has been pointed out that the
debt claims which the measure protects are only those "which arose prior
to. vesting with reference to or out of actions related to" vested property. 0 8
Even these creditors seem denied dccess to the courts, and payment may be
rejected or postponed whenever the custodian "shall be of the opinion that
the payment of any debt claim would be contrary to the interest of the United
States." Moreover, frozen or blocked property under Treasury Department
control would still remain free from debt claims of American creditors. 0 9
4. Claims of enemy owners. While it is premature now to determine the
extent to which claims of enemy owners of vested property shall be compen-
sated, the practice of the custodian to keep vested property and the proceeds
thereof in appropriate accounts should be sanctioned and 12 of the Act
declared not applicable thereto in its requirement that proceeds of sales be
deposited forthwith in the Treasury, with perhaps the consequent result
that their identity will be lost. The door will thus be kept open to such
later disposition of the claims of enemy owners as Congress, or the peace
treaties, may finally determine.
5. Administrative problems in the Office of Alien Property Custodian.
The lack of doubt as to the applicability of the remaining sections of the Act
to acts of the custodian appointed pursuant to 5(b) would be cured, so far
as various administrative problems of the custodian are concerned, by H.R.
5031.10 This bill is limited to "property or interest vested by the Alien
Property Custodian by action subsequent to December 18, 1941," while still
106Cf. The Pietro Campanella, 47 F. Supp. 374 (D. Md. 1942) in which former enemy
owners of vessels vested by the custodian were permitted to defend libels for forfeiture
notwithstanding the vesting of their title by the custodian. Moreover, the prohibition
of suits by nonresident enemy aliens still prevails as a protective measure. Ex parte
Colonna, 314 U. S. 510, 62 Sup. Ct. 373 (1942) ; Ex parte Kawato, supra note 105, at
75, 76. Professor Borchard has stated: "The Custodian could have legalized his far-
reaching proposal by providing for royalty compensation on the patents he licenses,
the compensation to be held in trust for private owners." Borchard, Nationalization of
Einemy Patents (1943) 37 Am. J. INT. L. 92, 96.
107H. R. 3750, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). For an earlier f6rm of this bill see
H. R. 3749, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
10Cf. Banco Mexicano v. Deutsche Bank, 263 U. S. 591, 44 Sup. Ct. 209 (1924).





preserving otherwise the provisions of the existing Act, thereby avoiding the
problems incident to a repeal by implication or otherwise of inconsistent and
duplicating provisions of the Act. The custodian's authority under existing
law would remain unimpaired, the new provisions acting to supplement and
reinforce that authority. Questions such as the authority of the custodian
to pay current expenses out of funds held by him, the applicability of taxes
to vested property, and the liability of vested property to attachment pro-
ceedings, would be settled by this proposed measure.
EXECUTIVE ORDERS
The drafting of executive orders necessarily takes place without' the advan-
tage of the fully developed legislative technique of Congress. The refining
process which is involved in the consideratidn in committee and on the floor
of the objectives and effect of a proposed bill, the debate and the accompany-
ing weighing and sifting of the terms employed in the bill, are lacking. The
drafting of executive orders is less deliberate and is confined to fewer hands;
opportunities for human error and oversight are therefore more likely to
be present.'
Approaching in this light the defects in Order 9095 establishing the Office
of Alien Property Custodian discussed above, it is believed that this Order
should be amended and supplemented by further executive orders in the
following respects:
1. In order to settle the question whether the custodian may exercise,
independently of the Secretary of the Treasury, the 5 (b) powers under which
vested property may be "used.... liquidated, sold or otherwise dealt with,"
an express conferment of such powers upon the custodian should be made.
But the exercise of these powers, partaking as they do of appropriation in-
stead of custodianghip, should be limited to property of "nationals of desig-
nated enemy countries," with such enlargement in meaning of that term
as may be necessary for the purpose, and should not be permitted to extend
to property of other "foreign nationals" except as first determined by the
president.
2. The "terms and conditions" upon which the delegated powers shall
be exercised should be amplified, at least to the extent of reaffirming the
"Problems incident to executive regulations of the nature of Executive Orders
are not confined to this country. In England, the "Active Back Bench" (as opposed to
the Front Bench where the ministers sit) composed of 28 Members of Parliament,
"has set itself to watch the overwhelming flood of statutory orders whose terminology
is often obscure. . . The group claims that the number of obscurities and orders has
already diminished, but they are proud, above all, of inducing the Government to appoint
a committee to examine continuously such delegated legislation." WALL STREET JoUR.,
Aug. 14, 1944, at 1.
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standard prescribed in 5 (b) for their exercise that it shall be "in the interest
of and for the benefit of the United States."
3. Designation should be made of the "foreign countries" referred to in
Section 2(b), (d) and (e) of the Order whose property of the classes therein
defined shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the custodian. In so far as
regulatory measures of the custodian are concerned, these countries should
be defined to be the blocked countries designated in Order 8389. In so far
as control through vesting is concerned, the exercise of such powers should
be limited to "nationals of designated enemy countries" or some newly de-
fined category of enemy interest.
4. There should be an express conferment of authority and direction
covering the custodian's patent licensing program and its royalty-free
features. It should be apprecilted that such an unequivocal executive ap-
proval and assumption of responsibility will, however, directly raise questions
of international responsibility to protesting nations which at some time must
be met."12
5. A formal ratification and approval should be made of all prior acts of
the custodian performed in reliance on Order 9095, if within the scope of
the conferral of authority first above recommended. Apart from questions
raised in the patent licensing policy of the custodian in connection with
patents of nationals of enemy-occupied countries, it is believed that no acts
of the custodian outside the scope of the first recommendation above have
taken place, and hence such a ratification should be sufficient to cure any ques-
tions raised by virtue of any deficiency in the present terms of Order 9095.
CONCLUSIONS
Our foreign property control system in all its present complexity and
ramifications has sprung from a relatively simple statutory provision. The
very simplicity and breadth of 5(b) has indeed made possible the extraordi-
nary expansion in the system of regulation and administration of foreign
property by the Executive which has taken place. But it is now evident
that further refinement in the statute and in executive orders under it is
necessary. The defects and gaps in the present structure of legislation and
executive orders should be remedied. The wartime powers of the statute
should be separated from those -intended for peacetime use; the problems
raised by the existing wartime controls should be recognized and the legis-
lative pblicy as to their handling should be settled; and it should be definitely
determined what remaining parts of the Act continue in force and to what
extent.n13I
11N. Y. Times, May 13, 1943, at 4; see Littauer, loc. cit. supra note 9.
1'3Cf. H. R. REP. No. 1507, supra note 4, at 2; Lourie, loc. cit. supra note 76, at 233.
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